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thin and shadowy accompaniment of certain cerebral processes, let us boldly identify it with those processes, and say that it is one and the same." For proof we are in both cases referred to the final chapter. Now we may be in complete accord with the author's theory, but having read his book from cover to cover we cannot see where he has proven it.

If we identify consciousness with certain cerebral processes, the fact remains that here are two aspects of one thing x —to be explored by psychology and the physiology of the nervous system respectively—whose mutual relations seem to be a subject of legitimate inquiry. It is precisely on this question that the author fails to enlighten his readers, the very problem on which the metaphysics which he condemns is thriving to this day. There is not a word in the book, e.g., about Richard Semon's theory of the *mneme*, particularly as applied to the nervous tissue, though on the other hand we find nothing in it, either, to bar the author from accepting this theory. As things are, his own views come dangerously near to inviting the charge of epiphenomenalism (cf. pp. 189f), for if no relation is established between consciousness and cerebral processes, and we can hardly doubt the objective quality of the latter, what else can consciousness be but their despised "accompaniment"?

A few words might be said about the author's polemics against "the confused idea of things existing 'in themselves' as apart from the way in which they appear to us" (p. 181). On page 4 we read: "If, then, all knowledge and all imagination is based on sense-impressions, it is clear that our notion of the universe is bound to remain forever of the most incomplete possible character. Supposing we had a few more senses, how very different everything would appear.... To a being thus endowed, the philosophy of a mere human being must appear indeed primitive.... Yet, though it would so vastly exceed ours, the intellect of even this being would be no nearer than *we* are to the ultimate mysteries of existence...." and so on and so forth. We must leave it to the author to reconcile these two statements; suffice it to say that Kant is *not* touched by his attack.

X. B. N.

THE INTUITIVE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE. By *N. O. Lossky*. Translated from the Russian by *N. A. Duddington*. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. xxx, 420. Price, 16s. net.

This work of Professor Lossky falls into two parts: the first, a summary of the problem of knowledge in modern philosophy which is mainly critical, and an examination of the systems of pre-Kantian empiricism and rationalism as presented in the systems of Locke, Berkeley and Hume; the second, Professor Lossky's own solution. He finds the same defect in all the attempts to solve the epistemological problem, which is "the assumption that the knowing subject is isolated from the known object." If knowledge and the known object are isolated from each other, knowledge can only correspond to the known object in the sense that in knowledge a more or less perfect *copy* is found of the known object. But if knowledge is a copy of an original which is external to the process of knowing, experience certainly does not provide us with any criterion for determining the degree of correspondence between the copy and the original. "Indeed, in this case, there are no conclusive grounds for affirming such a correspondence" (p. 31). Consistently carried

out, empiricism, therefore, was compelled to drop the discussion of the question as to the relation of knowledge to the external world.

Professor Lossky has his own solution. Let us assume, he contends, that reality is immanent in the knowing process, that "knowledge is neither a copy nor a symbol nor a phenomenal appearance of the real world in the knowing subject, but is reality itself" and all difficulties are disposed of. It does not, however, dispose of intuitions of error. Professor Lossky tells us that error is the failure to differentiate between the object as given and the fallacious subjective element of our own thought. Who is to separate the two elements? Professor Lossky's recommendation of "reiterated differentiations guided by the consciousness of objectivity" is not satisfactory.

He insists that a theory of knowledge is not called upon to take its stand upon a specific metaphysical conception of the world, but should be regarded as a branch of philosophical investigation which is preliminary both to metaphysics and to those departments of philosophy which have to do with the more concrete aspects of experience (p. viii). But it is not easy to keep strictly within the limits thus set, and Professor Lossky occasionally allows glimpses of his own attitude. For example, in the last chapter, after having urged that there is no antithesis between the universal and the individual, that the true universal is in fact what may be called "concrete universal," he proceeds to give his assent to the doctrine that a complete unity of the world is intelligible only if the world be thought of as grounded in an Absolute Reason, wherein all its aspects are coordinated and teleologically related to one another (p. 412). Professor Lossky's book, which is ably introduced by Professor Dawes Hicks, has distinct merits, lucid statement, vigorous and colored illustration, a wide philosophic knowledge; and not the least of the attractions to the English reader is the translation by Mrs. Duddington from a copy of the text specially revised by the author. M. J.

RECONCILIATION AND REALITY. By *W. Fearon Halliday, M.A.* (The Christian Revolution Series, Vol. 2.) London: Headley Bros., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 234. Price, 5s. net.

The editor of the Christian Revolution Series says in a general foreword that "these books are written under the persuasion that only a religious solution is adequate to the world's need, and that only upon the principles for which Jesus of Nazareth stands in history can the world be fashioned to heart's desire."

Mr. Halliday's contribution is not revolutionary. The beliefs which he expounds are intensely personal, but they are dressed out by modern science and medieval logic. Again and again the author brings his beliefs to the test of experience. His implication is "if we do not believe this or that, then we shall be unhappy; if we do believe this or that, then we have an explanation and a harmony." For instance, he says about nature: "It is difficult to think that God interferes with this order from without. If He does we are involved in endless difficulties as to why He does not interfere in a different manner." This type of argument is characteristic and is not valid except for pragmatists. Within these limits the book will be of value to those who are prepared to accept the premises.